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The Believing Game or Methodological Believing 
           Peter Elbow 
This is the text I submitted to the Journal—not the 
copy edited printed version.  Journal for The 
Assembly for Expanded Perspectives on Learning 
14 Winter 2009: 1-11. I gave an earlier version at the 
annual Conference on College Composition and 
Communication in New Orleans, April 2008 
 
In Writing Without Teachers I laid down a rule for what I called teacherless 
classes: no arguing. If a reader responds to your writing by saying something 
that seems wrong, don’t disagree, don’t argue, just listen and try to see your text 
through that reader’s eyes. The same when readers disagree with each other. 
“Eat like an owl: take in everything and trust your innards to digest what’s useful 
and discard what’s not” (this was a later formulation in Writing With Power, 264). 
But as I was in the process of finishing that book in 1972, it struck me that 
many readers would feel that it was an intellectual scandal to outlaw what 
people feel is foundation of good thinking: disagreement and argument. I 
decided I needed to write a theoretical justification of “no arguing.”  I clearly 
failed with Joe Harris who made exactly this critique in 1996: “[S]tudents in his 
workshops . . . do not seem to be held answerable to each other as intellectuals” 
(31). But I didn’t want theoretical writing to clutter up a very practical down to 
earth book, so I made it a long appendix essay. Ever since then, I’ve been 
chewing on the believing game: this seems to be my seventh essay (see Works 
Cited). Looking back on my career, I now see the believing game at the core of 
all my work.  
I still struggle with how to name it. In my second essay, I tried a fancier 
more theoretically self-conscious term, “methodological believing.” But then I 
worried that this was needlessly pretentious--and I like the irreverence of 
“game.” Yet now as I write this essay, “methodological” seems central.  
In what follows, I give a short definition of the believing game; then a tiny 
history of believing and doubting; and finally three arguments for the believing 
game. 
 
Definitions 
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I can define the believing game most easily and clearly by contrasting it 
with the doubting game. Indeed, the believing game derives from the doubting 
game. 
The doubting game represents the kind of thinking most widely honored 
and taught in our culture. It’s sometimes called “critical thinking.” It's the 
disciplined practice of trying to be as skeptical and analytic as possible with 
every idea we encounter. By trying hard to doubt ideas, we can discover hidden 
contradictions, bad reasoning, or other weaknesses in them--especially in the 
case of ideas that seem true or attractive. We are using doubting as a tool for 
scrutinizing and testing ideas. 
In contrast, the believing game is the disciplined practice of trying to be as 
welcoming or accepting as possible to every idea we encounter: not just 
listening to views different from our own and holding back from arguing with 
them; not just trying to restate them without bias (as Carl Rogers advocated); 
but actually trying to believe them. We are using believing as a different tool for 
scrutinizing and testing ideas. But instead of doubting in order to scrutinize 
fashionable or widely accepted ideas for hidden flaws, we use belief to 
scrutinize unfashionable or even repellent ideas for hidden virtues. Often we 
cannot see what's good in someone else's idea (or in our own!) till we work at 
believing it. When an idea goes against current assumptions and beliefs--or if it 
seems alien, dangerous, or poorly formulated---we often cannot see any merit in 
it.* 
---------------------- 
*I’m on slippery ground when I equate the doubting game with critical thinking, since 
critical thinking has come to mean almost any kind of good thinking. Consider this hopelessly 
vague definition at the head of the website of the Foundation for Critical Thinking  
  Critical thinking is the intellectually disciplined process of actively and skillfully 
conceptualizing, applying, analyzing, synthesizing, and/or evaluating information 
gathered from, or generated by, observation, experience, reflection, reasoning, or 
communication, as a guide to belief and action. In its exemplary form, it is based on 
universal intellectual values that transcend subject matter divisions: clarity, accuracy, 
precision, consistency, relevance, sound evidence, good reasons, depth, breadth, and 
fairness. 
  It entails the examination of those structures or elements of thought implicit in all 
reasoning: purpose, problem, or question-at-issue; assumptions; concepts; empirical 
grounding; reasoning leading to conclusions; implications and consequences; 
objections from alternative viewpoints; and frame of reference. Critical thinking — in 
being responsive to variable subject matter, issues, and purposes — is incorporated in 
a family of interwoven modes of thinking, among them: scientific thinking, mathematical 
thinking, historical thinking, anthropological thinking, economic thinking, moral 
thinking, and philosophical thinking.  
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  Critical thinking can be seen as having two components: 1) a set of information and 
belief generating and processing skills, and 2) the habit, based on intellectual 
commitment, of using those skills to guide behavior. . . . . People who think critically 
consistently attempt to live rationally, reasonably, empathically. (Scriven and Paul) 
Who could ever be against anything here (except the prose)? Thus critical thinking has 
come to stand for everything good in thinking—and opposed to everything bad (what Burke 
might have called a “god term”). This shows the monopoly of the doubting game in our culture’s 
conception of thinking itself.  
I’d argue, however, that despite all attempts to de-fuse the word critical of any skepticism 
or doubting, it still carries that connotation of criticism. (It’s as though the previous definition is 
really saying, “Please don’t think there’s necessarily any doubting in critical.”) The word critical 
still does that work for many fields that proudly wear it as a label. For example, in “critical 
theory,” “critical literacy,” and “critical legal theory,” the word still actively signals a critique, in 
this case a critique (of generally accepted “theory,” “literacy,” or “legal theory”). The OED’s first 
meaning for critical is “Given to judging; esp. given to adverse or unfavourable criticism; fault-
finding, censorious.” Not till the sixth meaning do we get past a censorious meaning to a sense 
of merely “decisive” or “crucial.” 
---------------------- 
 
A Short, Idealized History of Believing and Doubting  
Believing seems to come first. It looks as though it was evolutionarily useful 
for children to believe parents and others with authority. When I was very little, 
my older brother and sister held out a spoonful of horse radish and said, “Here. 
This is good.” I swallowed. After that, I wanted to distrust everything they told 
me, but soon I reverted to my natural trust and faith in them. That is, I tried for 
systematic doubt but failed. In the famous story (by O Henry?), the father tries to 
instill a more robust doubt by teaching his little girl to jump off the table into his 
arms--but then one day standing back and letter her crash to the floor.  
But swallowing what looks good is a deep habit. Unless people are 
vigorously trained in critical thinking, they tend to grow up into adults who have 
a propensity to believe what looks obvious or what they hear from people in 
authority or from the culture. Adults, not just children, used to assumed that a 
rain dance could make it rain; they used to burn witches because of disease 
outbreaks. And plenty of people still respond gullibly to emails saying they’ve 
won hundreds of thousands of dollars if they’ll just send one thousand dollars for 
legal fees. My wife is a volunteer tax preparer and health care counselor for 
senior citizens and has a remarkably sophisticated client who was just wiped 
entirely out by such a scheme.  
So human credulity gets us into trouble. But when some people get burned 
enough, they finally learn to doubt everything. We see this most nakedly in 
matters of the heart: some people who feel betrayed come to resist any close 
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attachment. Sadly, we’ve been living through an era that tempts us into blanket 
cynicism. I catch myself starting to reject as false by definition any 
announcement that comes from my government or any big corporation. We all 
know people who have developed a knee-jerk skeptical temperament and reject 
all ideas. 
But despite feeling betrayed by Bush and Exxon, I actually realize that it’s 
not careful thinking for me to reject any statement or information that comes 
from their direction. For I’m the inheritor of a more sophisticated kind of 
skepticism that has developed over the centuries. This is a tradition of 
systematic skepticism that I call the doubting game or methodological doubting. 
The goal is not to reject everything but to use skepticism as test to see which 
ideas are more worth trusting. 
Socrates was in on the development of logic and he showed the outlines of 
this systematic use of doubting in his adversarial dialogues (and note a 
recurrent playful or “game” element in those dialogues). He usually fueled these 
conversations with skeptical questions: “But why is it good to obey our parents, 
our rulers, and our traditions?” He spurred young people to question skeptically 
what their elders and their culture told them to believe. (He was killed for his 
efforts.)  
Descartes is famous for a more self-consciously formal version of 
methodological doubting. He said, “I will doubt everything.” But his goal was not 
to reject everything; his burning hunger was to find something he could believe--
something that survived the test of doubting. It was with so called Enlightenment 
thinking of the 18th century, with people like Voltaire undermining all religious 
authority, that a lot of this kind of skeptical rationality became fairly orthodox. 
And there was an important social dimension to enlightenment rationality. J. S. 
Mill gave the classic celebration of debate and argument. If we avoid censorship 
and create a truly free forum for the open debate of all ideas, he argues, we can 
winnow out bad thinking and find that ideas bear trust. 
Note the important difference between blanket, naive, unthoughtful 
skepticism that rejects everything and the use of doubting as a methodological 
tool where the goal is not to reject but to test in order to see what’s more 
trustworthy. Only temperamental skeptics are good at instinctive skepticism, 
but when a practice gets formulated as a tool--and we teach it as a conscious 
method in schools--then it’s available to people of all temperaments.  
Methodological doubting is central to the classical definition of scientific 
method (most famously formulated by Karl Popper): the process of trying to 
formulate various hypotheses about some particular issue in order to try to 
disprove those hypotheses--and thereby see which ones seem to survive. But 
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most scientists know that any faith they put in a hypothesis they fail to disprove 
can only be provisional faith. No amount of evidence can give certainty. The only 
certainty comes with negative skeptical claims such as “All swans are not 
white.”  
The incredible success of science has given powerful authority to the idea 
of methodological or systematic doubting. Scientific knowledge has garnered 
incredible authority in our culture because of the accomplishments of 
technology. The prinicple has become enshrined: we can advance knowledge if 
we try to doubt and disprove what we’re tempted to believe. For example, many 
people have faith in certain drugs or herbs that give them great relief, but 
scientifically double blind experiments show that many of these particular drugs 
don’t in themselves do the job. (I know: things are not quite as simple as the 
classic Popper story of scientific method. I’ll acknowledge that later.) 
So this is where we are. We honor systematic skepticism or the doubting 
game as the best form of thinking. It’s easy to doubt what’s dubious, but the 
whole point of systematic skeptism is to try to doubt what we find most obvious 
or true or right. We can’t act--or even think very far--unless we accept at least 
some view, so we want to know which views are most worthy of trust. Scientists 
do their best to disprove a hypothesis not because they want to reject it but in 
order to see if they can show it is worth trusting--for a while anyway.  
Let me continue this story briefly into the future. Note the progression so 
far: naive believing causes trouble, so this leads us to doubt. But total blanket 
rejecting is too blunt a tool--and not livable--and so our culture learned to 
develop a more sophisticated methodological skepticism.  
As you might guess, I think we’re ready to the other shoe to drop. That is, at 
the moment, we’re stuck with only naive belief. Our culture hasn’t developed 
methodological or systematic believing to match methodological doubting. We 
haven’t learned to use belief as a tool--as we use doubt as a tool. That is, over 
the centuries, we learned to separate the process of doubting from the decision 
to reject. But we haven’t learned to separate the process of believing from the 
decision to accept. This separation that we made in the case of doubting will feel 
difficult in the case of believing. For the process of believing has caused 
enormous problems--and still does--while the process of doubting has born 
great fruit. Therefore, the process itself of believing feels tainted; our concept of 
belief tends to connote the decision to accept, that is, commitment. We tend to 
feel that believing can never be a part of careful thinking.   
Since that appendix essay in Writing Without Teachers, I’ve been trying to 
describe methodological believing as a discipline--decoupled from commitment-
-decoupled from naive or temperamental credulity. I’ve been trying to show that 
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it is possible and that it makes sense to try to believe things that we don’t 
believe--especially things we don’t want to believe. And that trying can lead to a 
kind of conditional or temporary believing. People do it all the time--for instance 
when they hear and read tell fictional stories--and tell and write them. Just as 
you don’t have to be a skeptical person to use methodological doubting, you 
don’t have to be credulous or weak minded to believe things temporarily--and try 
to believe even more.  
If this sounds crazy, it’s probably because you’ve forgotten how hard it was 
hard to learn methodological doubting. When we were children, it seemed crazy 
for teachers to tell us that we should doubt multiple and conflicting ideas--that 
we should try to doubt ideas that we love. How can I doubt what seems right and 
precious to me--or doubt someone I trust? How can I doubt that the sun comes 
up in the morning? (When I taught at M.I.T., I regularly asked freshman to give 
me evidence for the why the earth spun on its axis and revolved around the sun. 
Many could not: their basis for accepting this idea was belief in doctrine or 
authority, not doubt of what’s obvious.) 
If you still think (naively) that it’s easy to practice systematic skepticism--to 
try to doubt what you want to believe--you need only notice that lots of very 
smart people still can’t do it. We see lots of our colleagues with PhDs who can 
only doubt ideas they don’t like. We give our schools the job of teaching this 
ability: whenever people make lists of goals or outcomes for education at every 
level, critical thinking is usually central, and in this case the term usually 
connotes rational skepticism. Critical thinking or careful doubting doesn’t come 
naturally to humans--especially to children. The point of a tool is to learn to do 
something that doesn’t come naturally. 
What especially interests me in true methodological doubting is the 
connative dimension: not just the need for an act of intellect, but also an act of 
effort or will. No one can make me doubt something I want to believe (for 
example, the efficacy of freewriting). It won’t happen unless I actually try. The 
good news is that we’ve built a culture of critical thinking--at least in the 
academy--that makes me feel that I’m not thinking carefully unless I do try to 
doubt what I want to believe--even freewriting. This is good. My argument here is 
that we need to build a richer culture of rationality--richer than mere doubting or 
critical thinking--so that people will feel that they are not thinking carefully 
unless they try to believe ideas they don’t want to believe. 
So just as methodological doubting is not natural, so too methodological 
believing is not natural. It’s not natural to try to believe ideas we disagree with or 
even hate. It has to be a tool or game that is decoupled from temperament or 
commitment. In short, methodological doubting and believing are symmetrical, 
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and I’m claiming that we need both. If we try systematically to doubt everything, 
we’re not trying to reject everything, we’re trying to find flaws we couldn’t see 
before. If we try systematically to believe everything, we’re not trying to accept 
everything, we’re trying to find virtues we couldn’t see before. In addition to 
discovering which ideas look best after the scrutiny of doubt, we can discover 
which ideas look best after the scrutiny of believing. And (as I’ll show soon) 
neither tool can demonstrate that anything is actually true.  
 
Three Arguments for the Believing Game 
(1) We need the believing game to help us find flaws in our own thinking. 
The doubting game is supposed to do this job, of course: not just find other 
people’s bad thinking but find weaknesses in our own thinking. But the doubting 
game or critical skepticism often falls down on this job. 
The flaws in our own thinking usually come from our assumptions---our 
ways of thinking that we accept without noticing--assumptions that are part of 
the very structure our thinking. Some assumptions are particularly invisible to 
us because we are living as part of a community and culture. It's hard to doubt 
what we live inside of: we can't see it and we unconsciously take it for granted.  
Here’s where the believing game comes to the rescue. Our best hope for 
finding invisible flaws in what we can't see in our own thinking is to enter into 
different ways of thinking or points of view--points of view that carry different 
assumptions. Only from a new vantage point can we see our normal point of 
view from the outside and thereby notice assumptions that our customary point 
of view keeps hidden.  
Of course the doubting game has one method for helping us find flaws in 
our own assumptions: debate. If we talk with others who disagree with us, and if 
we accept the rule of the doubting game that all ideas are fair game for debate--
even our own cherished ideas--then we have a good chance of finding flaws in 
what we take for granted.  
But most of the people we talk to live inside our culture, even our smaller 
community, and so we don’t run into people who question these culturally 
shared assumptions. And even if we do, critical thinking often helps us fend off 
any criticisms of our ideas or ways of seeing. We see this problem in much 
academic and intellectual interchange. When smart people are trained only in 
the tradition of the doubting game, they get better and better at criticizing the 
ideas they don’t like. They use this skill particularly well when they feel a threat 
to their ideas or unexamined assumptions.  
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Yet they feel justified in fending-off what they don’t like because they feel 
they are engaged in "critical thinking." They take refuge in the feeling that they 
would be "unintellectual" if they said to an opponent what in fact they ought to 
say: "Your idea sounds really wrong to me. It must be alien to how I think. Let me 
try to enter into it and get a better perspective on my thinking--and see if there's 
something important that you can see that I can’t see.” In short, if we want to be 
good at finding flaws in our own thinking (a goal that doubters constantly 
trumpet), we need the believing game.  
(2) We need the believing game to help us choose among competing 
positions. Again, the doubting game is supposed to do this job. But consider 
some of the typical arguments that swirl around us. Should we invade countries 
where atrocities are happening? Should we test school children with nation wide 
tests in order to improve schools that leave children behind? Should we use 
grades in teaching?   
The doubting game can reveal flaws or bad logic in arguments that support 
one position or another other. But flaws an argument do not demolish the 
position itself that these arguments are trying to support. We see this problem 
everywhere. Over and over we see illogical arguments for good ideas and 
logical arguments for bad ideas. We can never show that an idea or opinion or 
position is wrong--only that a supporting argument is wrong. No wonder people 
so seldom change their minds when someone finds bad reasoning in their 
argument.  
For example, there are arguments for and against military intervention to 
stop atrocities--for and against national testing and grading. It is possible to find 
flaws in many of those arguments, but logic cannot show that intervention or 
national testing or grading are right or wrong. To decide whether to invade or 
test or grade--these are decisions that involves acts of judgment. Decisions or 
acts of judgment always depend on how much weight to give various arguments. 
In short--and scientists are often more explicitly aware of this--the doubting 
game can find flaws, but it can’t make decisions for us. 
In fact, historians of science have shown cases where scientists have 
refused to give up on hypotheses that seemed to be disproven by experiments. 
They say things like “Well the testing was flawed” and even, “This hypothesis is 
just too beautiful to give up.” In effect, they’re saying, “The argument for my 
hypothesis is flawed, but that doesn’t mean my hypothesis is wrong.” They are 
making an act of judgment. I’d suggest that when they take positions like these 
(succumbing, it might be said, to “mere feeling” or “gut thinking”), they are 
actually using the believing game and finding virtues in a position that the 
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doubting game seems to disqualify. Perhaps the disconfirmation was flawed; or 
perhaps there were flaws in how the position was formulated. 
And suppose you are trying to get others to choose among options--that is, 
you are trying to persuade people who disagree with you. You will probably use 
the doubting game to show flaws in their arguments. Fair enough. But often 
(surprise!) they don’t change their mind and immediately agree with you. But 
you haven’t disproved their position, only their supporting arguments. They 
won’t change their position unless you can get them to see the issue the way you 
see it. For that, you need the believing game. Of course you can’t make them 
take the risk of playing the game--of actually trying to believe your position, even 
hypothetically and temporarily. But the believing game is inherently 
collaborative. Your have no leverage for asking them to try to believe your 
position unless you start by taking the risk yourself of trying to believe their 
position. The best way to introduce the believing game is to play it and show that 
you’ve given a good faith effort to believe what they believe--even asking them to 
help you. 
But there danger here. Your mind can be changed. (This is a not-hard-hat 
job.) And believing game may see permissive, but there’s also a surprising 
principle of rigor that Wayne Booth articulated: that we cannot validly reject an 
idea till we’ve succeeded in dwelling in it--in effect believing it. If you in your 
mind dismiss their idea as crazy--or even if you can restate their idea “nicely” 
but from your alien point of view (the Carl Rogers task)--there may be something 
valuable and correct in it, but that you’re still too blind to see. They may seem 
wrong or crazy--they may be wrong or crazy--but nevertheless they may be 
seeing something that none of us can see.  
We may feel totally for or against invading to stop atrocities or national 
testing or grading--but usually there are gray areas that the believing game is 
particularly good at uncovering. It might help you believe that there are certain 
conditions or certain senses in which it makes sense to invade, test, or grade. 
Most “real world” practical problems or disputes are deeply hermeneutic--more 
like interpreting a text than getting the right answer in geometry. To show that a 
text truly means X does not displace the claim that it also means something quite 
contrary to X (even if only partly or in certain senses). 
Bottom line: The doubting game is a tool. It won’t make a decision for us; it 
just puts us in a better position to exercise judgment about matters that cannot 
be proven. The believing game is also a tool. Our judging will be more 
trustworthy if we can use the believing game to find hidden virtues that might 
exist in positions that are supported by faulty arguments. Tools help us think 
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better. This leads to my third argument for the believing game. It’s about 
thinking. 
(3) We need the believing game in order to achieve goals that the doubting 
game neglects. I’ve given two arguments for how the believing game helps the 
doubting game meet its own goal. Now argue how the believing game also 
serves a completely different goal: how develops a different kind of careful 
thinking from what the doubting game develops--a different dimension of our 
intelligence or rationality, and also a different way of interacting with others. 
This is no argument against the doubting game in itself, since it obviously 
develops an indispensable dimension of intelligence or rationality. The only thing 
I’m arguing against is the monopoly of the doubting game in our culture’s notion 
of rationality or careful thinking--a monopoly that has led us to neglect a 
different and equally indispensable kind of careful thinking. 
So now I’ll contrast the doubting game and believing game as ways of using 
the mind and of functioning with others: 
Phenomenologically, the doubting game teaches us to fend off, spit out, 
guard ourselves. The believing game teaches us to welcome or swallow For us 
sophisticated children of the doubting game, this is not easy: trying to believe an 
alien idea can make us fear being changed or polluted. 
With regard to learning, the doubting game teaches us to extricate or 
detach ourselves from ideas. In contrast, the believing game teaches us to enter 
into ideas--to invest or insert ourselves. Wayne Booth talks about the need to 
learn to “dwell in” an idea if we want to understand it. Polanyi insists that there is 
a “fiduciary transaction”--a core of trust--that is tacit in all learning. As children 
of the doubting game, we carefully invite our students to read and listen with a 
skeptical mind, but nevertheless that skepticism will not be very intellectually 
productive unless students have first fully understood what we want them to 
view skeptically. This means listening and entering into the words. (Think of all 
the believing and trusting it takes to get an M.I.T. degree in science. They have 
to learn a lot--“trying to drink out of a fire hydrant” is the common metaphor. 
There’s no time to do much skeptical doubting.)  
Language vs. experience. The doubting game is the rhetoric of 
propositions while the believing game is the rhetoric of experience. The 
doubting game teaches us that we can test or scrutinize points of view better if 
we put them into propositional form. This helps us bring logic to bear and see 
hidden contradictions (symbolic logic being the ideal form for scrutinizing 
thinking). The believing game teaches to try to understand points of view from 
the inside. Words can help, but the kind of words that most help us experience 
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ideas tend to be imaginative, metaphorical, narrative, personal, and even poetic 
words.  
But not just words. Images and sounds and body movements are 
particularly helpful for entering into alien ideas. Role playing--and yes, silence. 
When someone says what seems all wrong, the most productive response is 
often merely to listen and not reply at all. Teachers can productively insist on 
short periods of silence after a controversial point has been made. Not all 
cultures are so wedded to argument with its proliferation of words. In many 
cultures, silence is felt to correlate with good thinking. 
With regard to action. The doubting game teaches us the value of 
disengaging from action--pausing, standing back, standing on the sidelines. This 
helps us see flaws we miss when we jump in and act on a point of view. The 
believing game teaches us to engage or act on an idea—and sometimes we 
cannot understand something till we’ve engaged and acted. This is where role 
playing gets its power: understanding through doing and inhabiting--not 
debating. 
Gender. The doubting game promotes ways of using the mind and being 
with others that have been associated in our culture with masculinity: arguing, 
resisting, saying no, pushing away, competing, being aggressive. The believing 
game promotes mental and social activity that has been associated in our 
culture with femininity: being compliant, listening, absorbing, swallowing, 
accepting, saying yes, not arguing back, not sticking up for own view. When 
women play the doubting game--arguing, disagreeing, and debating--they are 
often seen as less feminine. When men function play the believing game--not 
arguing back, accepting, trying to help the other person’s point of view--they are 
often seen as less masculine. 
The individual and social dimensions. The doubting game promotes both 
individualism and social interaction. It promotes individualism by inviting the 
lone person to question and doubt the group and see the self as separate and 
different. As Socrates pointed out, logic allows the individual to outvote the 
group. But the doubting game is also highly social, since it invites us to use 
others in argument and debate in order to find flaws in what looks reasonable or 
natural--and especially to find flaws in our own views.  
So too, the doubting game promotes both social action and individualism. It 
invites the social process of enlisting others to help us look for virtues in what 
seems wrong hopelessly wrong to us. Here, the intellectual leverage comes 
from the cooperative process of merging with others. Temporarily at least, the 
individual pushes aside her differences and sense of uniqueness and tries 
instead to blend with others. “Help me see what you see; I can’t see it.” The 
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believing game doesn’t strike me as highly individualistic except in this one 
crucial way: it invites the individual to listen and take seriously her own 
experience and point of view--even if it looks crazy--and not feel that one must 
subordinate one’s perceptions or experience or thinking to that of the group. 
But it supports this kind of individualism by asking for a flexible, constantly 
shifting methodological groupishness. It invites an individual who looks crazy to 
others to say, “Stop arguing with me; just listen for a while. If you can, help me 
make my position clearer and better.”  
Consider a few of the ways that the believing game helps with the central 
activities of academic life. 
Reading. The believing game helps us enter more fully into texts that we 
find difficult or alien--and also helps us discover and understand a wider range 
of interpretations. We want to teach students critical thinking, but they also 
need to learn to enter into texts that feel alien to them--to dwell in them and 
experience them--not stay untouched and outside them.  
Discussion. Because of the dominance of critical thinking, especially in the 
academy, academics and students tend to feel that the best way to show they 
are smart is by pointing out flaws in the views of others. Discussions can take an 
adversarial tone. People tend to feel un-smart when they don’t see the flaws that 
“smart” people point out--or when they say something like, “What? Tell me more 
about that. I’m trying to see it as you see it.” Discussions tend to be more fruitful 
if we have more people giving this believing game response. (In discussions 
among philosophers, it often counts as an indictment when someone says, “I fail 
to be able to understand your train of thought.”) 
Writing. Our current model for academic or essayist writing tends to be 
adversarial. When people write an essay advancing a position, especially in the 
academy, they are usually expected start off trying to show that all other points 
of view are wrong. There are epistemological problems with this ritual. As we 
see most clearly in the interpretation of texts, right and wrong is not an either/or 
matter. The believing game suggests modes of writing persuasively and 
analytically that are nonadversarial. 
 
Concluding Reflections 
The believing game is alive in our midst--but not well. Look more closely at 
people who are deeply smart and creative rather than just quick in debate; 
people who work out new ideas and creative solutions rather than just criticizing 
or developing existing ideas; people who collaborate productively with others 
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and bring about action. I think you’ll see that the believing game is central to the 
good work many of these people do. 
But because of our current model of good thinking (rational skepticism or 
the doubting game), most of us lack the lens or the language to see skill these 
people exhibit--to dwell genuinely in ideas alien from their own--as intellectual 
sophistication or careful thinking. When we see them listening and drawing out 
others, we call them generous or nice rather than smart. We don’t connect good 
listening to intelligence. We say “Isn’t it wonderful how they can mobilize others 
and actually get things done,” but we see that as a social and personal gift 
rather than an intellectual skill. We call creativity a mystery. And because our 
intellectual model is flawed in these ways, we don’t teach this ability to enter into 
alien ideas.  (See my 2005 College English essay for extensive suggestions for 
classroom uses of the believing game.)* 
------------------------ 
*There’s a teaching method that is widely used in some fields that reflects a tacit understanding 
of the believing game: role playing. And there’s an even more widely accepted teaching method 
that favors the rhetoric of experience (central to the believing game)--and not just the rhetoric of 
propositions. That is, many teachers in various fields use workshops to help teach concepts to 
the students. They recognize the limitation of lectures and reading since they operate by 
propositions. They acknowledge Dewey’s point that we cannot hand an idea to someone like a 
brick--that we need to set up an experience that leads the learner to create the idea herself. 
Experiential education has grown into a lively field with various journals and many conferences. 
------------------------ 
A parting testament to the doubting game. In case you persist in thinking 
that I’m biased against the doubting game, let me acknowledge that this essay is 
an exercise in skeptical doubting. All three of my arguments criticize 
weaknesses or flaws in the doubting game; I am being critical, adversarial, 
combative, practical, and hard-assed; I’m using discursive propositional 
language, not experientially oriented language. I am using the doubting game as 
a tool to try to undermine what I see as misguided faith in the doubting game. If I 
wanted to use the believing game here, I’d have done better to tell stories and 
convey experiences--whether in words or, ideally, in workshop activities. (I’ve 
settled for inserting a few micro-story-examples.) One of the advantages of the 
doubting game is quickness--and I’m trying to make this a short essay. I hope my 
use of the doubting mode reinforces my larger message: I’m not trying to get rid 
of the doubting game--merely to add the believing game. 
Summary. The doubting game and believing game are tools or methods. As 
such they cannot make decisions for us. The doubting game can’t prove that a 
position is wrong; the believing game can’t prove validity. For decisions we need 
to make judgments. But our judgments will be better if we get to use both sets of 
  14 
   
tools. In summary, I’m arguing for a richer and more accurate picture of 
rationality or intelligence or careful thinking.  
------------------------ 
I’ve been chewing on this bone so long that I can’t possibly acknowledged all the help I’ve 
gotten. But one important story hasn’t slipped my porous memory. I sent an early draft of my 
1986 essay to two friends. One gave me a powerful sharp critique--a brilliant performance of the 
doubting game. It should have been enormously helpful, but I somehow couldn’t digest or use it--
it stopped me. The other friend--the late, brilliant, much-missed Paul Connolly--gave me a 
brilliant believing game response. He entered in and speculated and fantasized about what 
might make sense in my draft. This response got me to move--it carried me forward to better 
thinking and a better essay. There’s no need to run away from a crass benefit of using the 
believing game as a response technique: when we ask for believing feedback, we are saying 
“Please give me some more good material for my essay?” 
 
 
    Works Cited 
 
Booth, Wayne. “Blind Skepticism versus a Rhetoric of Assent.” College English, 
67.4 (March 2005): 377-88. 
---. Critical Understanding: The Powers and Limits of Pluralism. U of Chicago, 
1979. 
Elbow, Peter. “Appendix Essay. The Doubting Game and the Believing Game: An 
Analysis of the Intellectual Process.” In Writing Without Teachers. Oxford 
University Press, 1973. 147-91. 
---. “The Doubting Game and the Believing Game.” Pre/Text: An Inter-Disciplinary 
Journal of Rhetoric 3.4 (Winter 1982). 
---. “Methodological Doubting and Believing: Contraries in Inquiry.” In Embracing 
Contraries: Explorations in Learning and Teaching. Oxford University 
Press, 1986. 254-300. 
---. “The Believing Game: A Challenge after Twenty-Five Years.” In Everyone Can 
Write: Essays Toward a Hopeful Theory of Writing and Teaching Writing. 
NY: Oxford University Press, 2000. 76-80. 
---, “Bringing the Rhetoric of Assent and The Believing Game Together--and into 
the Classroom.” College English 67.4 (March 2005): 388-99. 
---. “The Believing Game and How to Make Conflicting Opinions More Fruitful.” In 
Nurturing the Peacemakers in Our Students: A Guide to Teaching Peace, 
Empathy, and Understanding. Chris Weber, editor. Heinemann, 2006. 16-
25.  
  15 
   
Harris, Joseph. A Teaching Subject: Composition Since 1966. Upper Saddle 
River: Prentice-Hall, 1997. 
Polanyi, Michael. Personal Knowledge: Toward a Post-Critical Philosophy. New 
York: Harper and Row, 1958. 
Rogers, Carl Ransom. Client-Centered Therapy. NY: Houghton Mifflin, 1951. 
Scriven, Michael and Richard Paul. “Defining Critical Thinking.” Posted 
prominently at the website of the Foundation for Critical Thinking. 
www.criticalthinking.org 
